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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
substitutionary gift had been intended, the Court started with the principle
37
that words are not to be rejected if they can reasonably be made consistent,
and then construed the whole will in order to determine the testator's basic
intent. 38 The Court on reading the entire will found ample evidence that the
testator knew how to provide for an indefeasibly vested remainder in the eleventh paragraph of the same document and concluded that since he knew the
correct method of accomplishing this, his use of different words meant he had
a different intention.
As pointed out by Judge Fuld in his dissenting opinion, it is equally clear
that the testator knew how to providefor substitutionary gifts when he intended
39
them.
It appears that there is a basic difference between the Larkin and Gulbenkian cases in that in the Larkin case there were explicit words of survivorship.
The only question to be answered was survive whom. In the Gulbenkian case
it is doubtful if survivorship was intended at all.
D.G.M.
FRAUDULENT DESTRUCTION OF WILLS

Section 143 of the Surrogate's Court Act provides that "A lost or destroyed
will can be admitted to probate in a surrogate's court, but only in cases where
the will was in existence at the time of the testator's death, or was fraudulently
destroyed in his lifetime." (Emphasis added.) The issue of what constitutes the
fraudulent destruction of a will arose in ln re Fox's Will.40 In that case decedent was an American citizen residing in Germany during World War II. Fearing that the German Government would confiscate a United States trust of
which he was the beneficiary, he executed a will exercising a power of appointment in favor of petitioner, a United States resident. The corpus of the trust
was seized in the United States by the Alien Property Custodian. In 1944 the
will was destroyed in a bombing raid. The decedent learned of the destruction
of the will but failed to execute a new one. He died two years later at which
time petitioner brought this action under Section 143. The Surrogate, finding
that the will had been fraudulently destroyed, admitted it to probate.41 The
42
Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition.
The Court of Appeals found that the will was fraudulently destroyed.
37. In re Buechner, 226 N.Y. 440, 123 N.E. 741 (1919).
38. In re Gautier's Will, 3 N.Y.2d 502, 169 N.Y.S.2d 4 (1957).
39. In re Gulbenkian's Will, 9 N.Y.2d 363, 368, 214 N.Y.S.2d 379, 385 (1961):
In each of paragraphs Third and Fourth, for instance, he gave $50,000 to a named
sister and explicitly provided that, "in case of her prior death," the bequest was
to go to her decendants per stirpes.
40. 9 N.Y.2d 400, 214 N.Y.S.2d 405 (1961).
41. 17 Misc. 2d 773, 184 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1959).
42. 9 A.D.2d 365, 193 N.Y.S.2d 794 (1st Dep't 1959). The petition was dismissed on
the grounds that the destruction of the will had been orally adopted by the decedent. This
was error since it is clear that oral declarations of the decedent are incompetent to establish
or revoke a will. In re Staiger's Will, 243 N.Y. 468, 472, 154 N.E. 312, 314 (1926); In
re Kennedy's Will, 167 N.Y. 163, 170, 60 N.E. 442, 444 (1901).
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Whenever a will previously executed cannot be found after the death of the
4
testator, there is a strong presumption that it was revoked by the testator. a
The purpose of Section 143 is to give an intended beneficiary the opportunity
to'overcome this presumption and gain the legacy he would have received if
the will had not been destroyed. Since the effect on the beneficiary is the same
whether the will was accidently or intentionally destroyed, courts will find constructive fraud where it can be shown that the will was destroyed without the
knowledge of the testator. 44 The majority thus interprets the term "fraudulently
destroyed" as referring not to the motive for destruction but solely to the
agency of destruction. Thus if a will is destroyed by accident or without the
knowledge (at the time of destruction), consent, or procurement of the testator,
45
it was done so in a manner fraudulent to the testator.
The dissenting. opinion is in accord with the majority to the extent that
when the testator has no knowledge of the act, it will presume that there is
constructive fraud. However, when a testator, knowing that his will has been
annihilated, accepts the fact and does nothing about it despite a reasonable
opportunity to make a new will, the dissent argues that he has not been a
victim of fraud, actual or constructive.
The cases from which the majority derived its rule can all be distinguished
from the case at bar.46 In those cases there is no evidence showing that the
testator ever knew of the destruction of his will. In the present case, it is
clearly evident that the testator had such knowledge. In an earlier case, Timo
v. Claffy,47 the will was destroyed with the testator's knowledge but not in
conformance with the Decedent Estate Law.48 There, even though the destruction was not according to statute so that it did not revoke the will, it was still
held that the will was not fraudulently destroyed. The majority distinguished
this case because there was also undue influence present which it felt was the
real basis for the decision. However, as a minimum there is dicta in the case
which supports the dissenting opinion and research discloses no cases in which
a fraudulently destroyed will was admitted to probate where the testator at
the time of his death had actual knowledge that his will was destroyed.
43. Colyer v. Collyer, 110 N.Y. 481, 486, 18 N.E. 110 (1888); In re Kennedy's Will,
supra note 42; In re Staiger's Will, supra note 42.
44. Schultz v. Schultz, 35 N.Y. 653 (1886); In re Breckwoldt's Will, 170 Misc. 883,
11 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Surr. Ct. 1939); In re Dorrity's Will, 118 Misc. 725, 194 N.Y. Supp. 573
(Surr. Ct. 1922); In re Gethins' Will, 97 Misc. 561, 163 N.Y. Supp. 398 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
45. Schultz v. Schultz, supra note 44; In re Breckwoldt's Will, supra note 44.
46. Ibid.
47. 45 Barb. 438 (1865), aff'd, Conroy v. Claffy, 41 N.Y. 619 (1869).
48. N.Y. Dec. Est. Law § 34:
No will in writing . . . shall be revoked or altered otherwise than by some other
will in writing . . .executed with the same formalities with wbich the will itself
was required by law to be executed; or unless such will be burnt, torn, canceled,
obliterated or destroyed, with the intent and for the purposes of revoking the
same . . . and when so done by another person, the direction and consent of the
testator, and the fact of such injury or destruction, shall be proved by at least

two witnesses.
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It also seems that the majority opinion is misconstruing the intended
meaning of Section 143. The statute refers to fraud. It is straining the meaning of the statute to find constructive fraud where the will was accidently
destroyed without the testator's knowledge. It is unrealistic to find fraud, actual
or constructive, when the testator had knowledge of the events which occurred
and had a reasonable opportunity to execute a new will but failed to do so
prior to his death.
J. D. R.
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Section 147 of the Surrogate's Court Act permits any person to file objections to the probate of a will who is "interested in the event as a devisee,
legatee or otherwise. '49 This section is in accordance with the more general
right to intervene set forth in Section 193-b of the Civil Practice Act.5° . In an
earlier decision, In re Davis' Will, 51 the Court of Appeals interpreted Section
147 to include only a person having a pecuniary interest to protect, either as
an individual or in a representative capacity. By this the Court meant anyone
who would be deprived of property in a broad sense or who would be entitled
52
to property by probate of a will.
In the recent case of In re Turton,53 the Court was called upon to determine whether the Surrogate's Court had properly denied a motion by the government of British Honduras to intervene specially in probate proceedings
pending in that court.54 Decedent was domiciled in British Honduras, as were
his descendants who were all illegitimates. Prior to the commencement of the
action in the Surrogate's Court, a court of British Honduras had ordered that
a will left by the decedent, purportedly executed in 1918, be admitted to probate "until a later will be found." Thereafter, an action was brought in the
British Honduras court to have the 1918 will declared revoked and to probate
the alleged will of 1955 as a lost or destroyed testament. While that action
remained undetermined, the New York Surrogate assumed jurisdiction to probate the 1955 will, basing jurisdiction on the presence in New York of stock
49. N.Y. Surr. Ct. Act § 147:
Any person interested in the event as devisee, legatee or otherwise, in a will,
codicil offered for probate ... may file objections to any will or codicil so offered
for probate.
50. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 193-b:
Upon timely application any person shall be permitted to intervene in an action ...
(c) when the applicant has an interest in real property, the title to which may be
affected by the judgment . . . (d) when the applicant is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of or subject to the control of or disposition by the court or an officer thereof.
51.

182 N.Y. 468, 75 N.E. 530 (1905).

52. Id. at 472, 75 N.E. at 534.
53. 8 N.Y.2d 311, 206 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1960).
54. 20 Misc. 2d 569, 192 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Surr. Ct. 1959), aff'd, 9 A.D.2d 759, 193
N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1st Dep't 1960).

